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Abstract. The paper presents TrustMAS – Trusted Communication Platform 
for Multi-Agent Systems, which provides trust and anonymity for mobile 
agents. The platform includes anonymous technique based on random-walk al-
gorithm for providing general purpose anonymous communication for agents. 
All agents, which take part in the proposed platform, benefit from trust and 
anonymity that is provided for their interactions. Moreover, in TrustMAS there 
are StegAgents (SA) that are able to perform various steganographic communi-
cation. To achieve that goal, SAs may use methods in different layers of 
TCP/IP model or specialized middleware enabling steganography that allows 
hidden communication through all layers of mentioned model. In TrustMAS 
steganographic channels are used to exchange routing tables between StegA-
gents. Thus all StegAgents in TrustMAS with their ability to exchange informa-
tion by using hidden channels form distributed steganographic router (Steg-
router). 
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1   Introduction 
In this paper, we present and evaluate a concept of TrustMAS - Trusted Communica-
tion Platform for Multi-Agent Systems which was initially introduced in [21]. For this 
purpose we have developed a distributed steganographic router and steganographic 
routing protocol. To evaluate the proposed concept we have analyzed: security, scala-
bility, convergence time, and traffic overheads imposed by TrustMAS. Presented in 
this paper simulation results proved that proposed system is efficient. 
TrustMAS is based on agents and their operations; an agent can be generally clas-
sified as stationary or mobile. The main difference between both types is that statio-
nary agent resides only on a single platform (host that agent operates on) and mobile 
one is able to migrate from one host to another while preserving its data and state.  
Generally, systems that utilize agents benefit from improved: fault tolerance (it is 
harder for intruder to interrupt communication when it is distributed), scalability and 
flexibility, performance, lightweight design and ability to be assigned to different 
tasks to perform. Moreover, systems that consist of many agents interacting with each 
other form MAS (Multi-Agent System). The common applications of MAS include:  
• network monitoring (IDS/IPS systems like in [13]),  
• network management,  
• information filtering and gathering (e.g. Google),  
• building self-healing, high scalable networks or protection systems (like 
proposed in [20]), 
• transportation, logistics and others (e.g. graphics computer games devel-
opment [9]). 
 
Multi-Agent Systems are usually implemented on platforms which are the tools 
that simplify implementation of specific systems. The most popular examples of such 
platforms are: JADE [12], AgentBuilder [1], JACK [11], MadKit [15] or Zeus [24].  
Mobile agents, which are used in TrustMAS, create dynamic environment and 
are able to establish ad-hoc trust relations to perform intended tasks collectively and 
efficiently. Particularly, challenging goals are authentication process where an iden-
tity of agent may be unknown and authorization decisions where a policy should 
accommodate to distributed and changing structure. Trusted cooperation in heteroge-
neous MAS environment requires not only trust establishment but also monitoring 
and adjusting existing relations. Currently, two main concepts of the trust establish-
ment for distributed environment exist: 
• reputation-based trust management (TM) ([5], [14]), which utilizes in-
formation aggregated by system entities to evaluate reputation of chosen 
entity; basically, decisions are made according to recommendations 
from other entities where some of them can be better than others; the 
most popular example of such trust management is PageRank imple-
mented in Google, 
• credential- (or rule-) based trust management ([3], [2]) that uses secure 
(e.g. cryptographically signed) statements about a chosen entity; deci-
sions based on this TM are more reliable but require better defined se-
mantics then reputation-based TM.  
 
For MAS environment we propose a distributed steganographic router which will 
provide ability to create the covert channels between chosen agents (StegAgents). 
Paths between agents may be created with the use of any of the steganographic me-
thods in any OSI RM (Open System Interconnection Reference Model) layer and be 
adjusted to the heterogeneous characteristics of a given network. This concept of a 
steganographic router, as stated earlier, is new in the steganography state of the art 
and also MAS technology seems to be very accurate to implement such router in this 
environment.  
To develop safe and a far-reaching agent communication platform it is required to 
enhance routing process with anonymity. The first concept of network anonymity was 
Mixnet proposed by Chaum in [4]. It has become a foundation of modern anonymity 
systems. The concept of Mixnet chaining with encryption has been used in a wide 
range of applications such as E-mail ([6]), Web browsing [10] and general IP traffic 
anonymization (e.g. Tor [8]). Other solutions like e.g. Crowds [17], may be consi-
dered as simplifications of Mixnet. By means of forwarding traffic for others it is 
possible to provide every agents’ untraceability. The origin of collaboration intent in 
this manner can be hidden from untrusted agents and eavesdroppers. 
2   TrustMAS Concept and Main Components 
This section is based on paper [21], where initial concept of TrustMAS was intro-
duced in greater details. Examples of Steg-router operations and other key TrustMAS 
components may be also found in [21]. The following section only briefly describes 
proposed solution to focus later mainly on security and performance analysis. 
 
2.1 Trust and Anonymity in TrustMAS 
MAS gives an opportunity to build an agents’ community. In such environments, like 
in human society, trust and anonymity become important issues as they enable agents 
to build and manage their relationships. Taking this into consideration we assume that 
there are no typical behaviors of the agents involved in the particular MAS communi-
ty, all agents may exist and live their lives in their own way (we do not define agents’ 
interests and there is no information about characteristics of exchanged messages). 
Additionally, because TrustMAS is focused on information hiding in MAS, we don’t 
assume that any background traffic exists. Abovementioned assumptions are generic 
and allow to theoretically describe TrustMAS. In real environment, such as IP net-
works, a background traffic exists and will aggravate detection of the system. 
Moreover, in order to minimize the uncertainty of the interactions each agent in 
TrustMAS must possess a certain level of trust for other agents. Agents interactions 
often happen in uncertain, dynamically changing and distributed environment. Trust 
supports agents in right decisions making, and is usually described as reliability or 
trustworthiness of the other communication sides. When the trust value is high, the 
party with which agent is operating gives more chances to succeed e.g. agents need 
less time to find and achieve their goals. On the contrary, when the trust value is low, 
the choice of the operating party is more difficult, time-consuming and provides less 
chances for success. In the proposed TrustMAS platform we provide trust and ano-
nymity for each agent wishing to join it. Main trust model of TrustMAS platform is 
based on a specific behavior of agents – waiting for expected scenario and following a 
dialog process means that agents are trusted. Other trust models, not included in this 
work, depend mainly on application of TrustMAS and can be changed accordingly.  
One of the important components in TrustMAS is an anonymous technique based 
on the random-walk algorithm [18]. It is used to provide anonymous communication 
for every agent in the MAS platform. The idea of this algorithm is as follows. If the 
agent wants to send a message anonymously, it sends a message (which contains a 
destination address) to a randomly chosen agent, which is selected based on the result 
of the flipping of an asymmetric coin (whether to forward the message to the next 
random agent or not). The coin asymmetry is described by a probability pf. The proxy 
agent forwards the message to the next random proxy agent with the probability of pf 
and skips forwarding with a probability of 1–pf. This probabilistic forwarding assures 
anonymity because any agent cannot conclude if messages received in this manner are 
originated from their direct sender. 
TrustMAS benefits from the large number of agents that are operating within it, 
because if many agents join TrustMAS it will be easier to hide covert communication 
(exchanged between secretly collaborating agents). Agents are likely to join the pro-
posed MAS platform because they want to use both trust and anonymity services that 
are provided for their interactions. To benefit from these features each agent has to 
follow one rule: if it wants to participate in TrustMAS it is obligated to forward dis-
covery steganographic messages according to the random-walk algorithm (which is 
described in Section 3.1). This may be viewed as the “cost” that agents have to “pay” 
in order to benefit from the trusted environment. 
 
2.2 Agents in TrustMAS 
In the TrustMAS we distinguish two groups of agents. One of them consists of Ordi-
nary Agents (OAs) which use proposed platform to benefit from two security services 
it provides (trust and anonymity). Members of the second group are Steganographic 
Agents (StegAgents, SAs), that besides OAs functionality, use TrustMAS to perform 
a covert communication.  
The following are features of agents in TrustMAS: 
• OAs are not aware of the presence of SAs, 
• OAs uses TrustMAS to perform overt communication e.g. for anonymous 
web surfing, secure instant messaging or anonymous file-sharing,  
• SAs posses the same basic functionality as OAs but they are capable of 
exchanging steganograms through covert channels, 
• each StegAgent is characterized by its address and steg-capabilities 
(which describe the steganographic techniques that SA can use to create a 
hidden channel to communicate with other SAs). 
• StegAgents that are localized in TrustMAS platform act as a distributed 
steganographic router, by exchanging hidden data (steganograms) through 
covert channels but also if they rely on the end-to-end path between two 
SAs they are able to convert hidden data from one steganographic method 
to another, 
• if in proposed platform malicious agents exist trying to uncover SAs (and 
their communication exchange), certain mechanisms are available (de-
scribed in later sections) to limit potential risk of disclosure, 
• StegAgents perform steganographic communication in various ways, es-
pecially by utilizing methods in different layers of the TCP/IP model. In 
particular, SAs may exploit other than application layer steganographic 
techniques by using specialized middleware enabling steganography 
through all layers in this model. In some cases there is a possibility to use 
only application layer steganography i.e. image or audio hiding methods. 
Hidden communication via middleware in different layers gives opportu-
nity for SAs to establish links outside the MAS platform. Examples of 
techniques in different layers of the TCP/IP model that enable covert 
channels include: audio, video, still images, text hiding steganography, 
protocol (network) steganography or methods that depend on available 
medium e.g. on WLAN links a HICCUPS [22]. 
 
In TrustMAS possibility of utilizing cross-layer steganography has certain advan-
tages. It provides more possibilities of exchanging hidden data and it is harder to 
uncover. However, building the communication paths with many different stegano-
graphic methods may introduce additional delays. Therefore, some state of the art 
information hiding techniques may be not sufficient to carry network traffic (remind-
ing that in some steganographic applications delay is not the best measure, because 
the best one is just to be hidden). 
 
2.3 TrustMAS Three-plane Architecture 
The proposed architecture of the TrustMAS may be described on three planes (Fig. 1). 
In the MAS PLATFORMS plane, the gray areas represent homogenous MAS plat-
forms, black dots represent StegAgents and white ones - Ordinary Agents involved in 
TrustMAS. StegAgents act as a distributed steganographic router (Steg-Router) as 
shown on STEG ROUTING plane. Connections are possible between StegAgents with 
the use of hidden channels, located in different network layers (NETWORK plane), 
and at the platform level. As mentioned earlier, the choice of steganographic methods 
used to communicate between each StegAgents, depends on their steg-capabilities. 
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Fig. 1 Architecture of TrustMAS 
3   Steg-router: Distributed Steganographic Router 
As mentioned earlier, all StegAgents in TrustMAS with their ability to exchange 
information by using hidden channels form a distributed steganographic router (Steg-
router). Proposed Steg-router is a new concept of building a distributed router to car-
ry/convert hidden data through different types of covert channels, where typically a 
covert channel utilizes only one steganographic method and is bounded to end-to-end 
connection. Moreover, it is responsible for creating and maintaining the covert chan-
nels (steg-paths) between chosen SAs. Conversion of hidden channels is performed in 
heterogeneous environment (e.g. a hidden information in an image converted into the 
hidden information in WLAN) and the MAS platform is used here as the environment 
to implement this concept. This gives opportunity to evaluate a new communication 
method and explore new potential threats in the MAS environment. 
The most important part of the proposed Steg-router is a steganographic routing 
protocol (Steg-routing protocol) which is described in next sections. The effective 
routing protocol is vital for agents’ communication and their performance. The 
routing protocol that will be developed for TrustMAS must take into account all spe-
cific features that cannot be found in any other routing environment. That includes 
providing anonymity with the random walk algorithm (and to perform discovery of 
new SAs) and usage of steganographic methods. Both these aspects affect perfor-
mance of the routing convergence. The first one influences updates: in order to pro-
vide anonymity service they must be periodic. The second one affects available 
bandwidth of the links. Due to these characteristic features the steganographic routing 
protocol for TrustMAS must be designed carefully. For abovementioned reasons none 
of the existing routing protocols for MANETs (Mobile Ad-hoc Networks) is appro-
priate. In agents environment, for security reasons, as well as for memory and compu-
tation power requirements, provided routing protocol is kept as simple as possible that 
is why should it belong to a distance vector routing protocols group. We chose a dis-
tance vector routing protocol without triggered updates for security reasons – mainly 
to avoid potential attacks connected with monitoring agents behavior. We can im-
agine a situation in which the aim of the malicious attacks is to observe agents beha-
vior after removing a random agent from the TrustMAS. If the removed agent was a 
StegAgent and if the Steg-routing protocol used triggered updates then suddenly there 
will be a vast activity in the TrustMAS, because triggered updates will be sent to 
announce changes in the network topology. From the same reason a distance vector 
protocol was chosen over the link state or a hybrid one.  
Proposed steg-routing protocol will be characterized by describing: discovery and 
maintenance of the neighbors (section 3.1), exchanging the routing tables (section 
3.2) and creating steg-links and steg-paths (section 3.3). 
 
3.1 Discovery of New SAs and Neighbors Table Maintenance 
As mentioned earlier, all the agents involved in the TrustMAS (both OAs and SAs) 
perform anonymous exchange based on random-walk algorithm. Thus StegAgents 
may also utilize this procedure to send anonymous messages with embedded stegmes-
sage (covert data), which consist of StegAgents’ addresses and steg-capabilities 
(available steganographic methods to be used for hidden communication).  Such me-
chanism is analogous to sending hello packets to the neighbors in classical distance 
vector protocols, where it is responsible for discovery and maintenance of the neigh-
bors table. In the proposed routing protocol random walk algorithm performs only 
discovery role. The maintenance phase is performed by all SAs that are already in-
volved in TrustMAS and by new SAs that want to join it. 
Moreover, each StegAgent maintains in its memory two tables: neighbors and 
routing table. The neighbors table is created based on information obtained from 
random-walk algorithm operations. The neighbor relation is formed between two 
StegAgents if there is a steg-link (exists a covert channel – a connection using stega-
nographic method that two SAs share) that connects them. Maintenance of the actual 
information in the neighbors table is achieved by sending, periodically, hello packets 
through formed steg-links. Such solution allows to identify the situation when one of 
the StegAgents becomes unavailable. 
Based on the information collected from the neighbors the routing table for each 
SA is formed. Analogously like in standard routing protocols, the routing table pos-
sesses best steg-paths (collections of steg-link between each two SAs). 
 
3.2 Routing Tables Exchange 
To exchange routing tables between StegAgents steganographic channels are used. In 
TrustMAS routing updates are sent at regular intervals to finally achieve proactive 
hidden routing. Routing proactivity provides unlinkability of the steganographic con-
nections and discovery processes. This procedure as well as further hidden communi-
cation is cryptographically independent. After the discovery phase, when the new 
SA’s neighbors table has the actual information, it receives entire routing tables from 
its neighboring StegAgents. Then the routing information is exchanged periodically 
between SAs. When a new SA receives the routing tables from its neighbors, it learns 
about other distant SAs and how to reach them. Based on this information formation 
of new steg-links with other SAs is possible. 
If one of the SAs becomes unavailable, the change is detected with the hello me-
chanism. Then the routing table is updated and the change is sent to all the neighbors 
in the neighbors table (when there is periodic time to send the entire routing table). 
Each routing entry in the routing table represents the best available steg-path to dis-
tance StegAgent with its metric. The metric is based on three factors: available ca-
pacity of the steg-links along the end-to-end steg-path, delays introduced along the 
steg-path and available steganographic methods. For security reasons some stegano-
graphic methods may be preferred over others (e.g. because they are more immune to 
steganalysis or less affect the content that is used to send covert data). 
 
3.3 Forming Steg-links and Steg-paths 
Steg-path is an end-to-end connection between two distant StegAgents. Every steg-
path is created based on available steg-links between SAs that form the steg-path. The 
algorithm of forming a steg-path uses metrics that are set for each steg-link. Routing 
metrics in TrustMAS are calculated as described in section 3.2.  
In case there are two equal hops to one destination available, the chosen steg-link 
is the one that has higher capacity value, introduces less delay and uses more pre-
ferred steganographic method. It is also possible that on the one steg-link two or more 
steganographic methods may be available. In this case metrics are calculated for each 
steganographic method and the best is chosen to the steg-path. Each SA is also re-
sponsible, if it is necessary, for converting steganographic channels according to the 
next hop SA steg-capabilities. In this way a steganographic router functionality is 
provided in TrustMAS.  
If the routing table is created and up to date then StegAgent is able to send data 
via hidden channels, where metrics are calculated based on the available stegano-
graphic methods. 
 Fig. 2 Forming a steg-path based on available steg-links between SAs 
 
Fig. 2 illustrates a simple example for six StegAgents between which five exem-
plary steg-links are created based on their steganographic capabilities. The discovery 
phase of the the StegAgents is omitted. Based on all available steg-links an end-to-
end steg-path is formed between StegAgent A and E (through proxy SAs B and C). 
Created steg-path consists of three steg-links. For each steg-link there is a stegano-
graphic method selected which will be used between neighboring StegAgents for 
hidden communication. Every proxy StegAgent that relays covert exchange is respon-
sible for conversion of hidden data between steganographic methods that it supports 
(e.g. in Fig. 2 if hidden data is sent through an end-to-end steg-path SA B is obligated 
to convert a steganogram from image to audio steganography).  
4 TrustMAS Security Analysis 
Security analysis of TrustMAS  will cover an analytical study of protocol based on an 
entropy measurement model. In 2002 Diaz et al. [7] and Serjantov et al. [18], simulta-
neously and independently, introduced a new methodology for anonymity measure-
ment based on Shannon’s information theory [19]. The information entropy proposed 
by Shannon can be applied to the anonymity quantification by assignment of proba-
bility of being an initiator of a specified action in the system to its particular users, 
nodes or agents. 
The adversary who foists colluding agents on the network can assign probabilities 
of being the initiator to particular agents. Based on [7] and [18] we can assign such a 
probability to the predecessor of the first colluding agent from the forwarding path  
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In the analyzed scenario it is assumed that the adversary has yet colluding agents 
among nodes which actively anonymize specified request. Practically, the scenario 
may be different, and what is more, a probability that the adversary can find this 
group of agents (referred to as an “active set”) also determines the efficiency of the 
system anonymization [16]. The scenario described above should be called adaptive 
attack as it is assumed that the adversary has possibilities to adapt an area of his ob-
servation to the scope of activity of system users. Though it is important to consider 
also more general case where the adversary cannot be certain of successive collabora-
tion of proper active agents. This attack will be referred to as a static attack as in this 
scenario the adversary “injects” colluding agents in a static manner and cannot dy-
namically predict which random agents will actively anonymize the specified request. 
A probability that none of the collaborating agents can become a member of the ran-
dom-walk forwarding path is 
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(5) 
Figure 2 shows entropy of TrustMAS as a function of the parameter number of col-
luding agents C for both adaptive and static attacks. 
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Fig. 2. Impact of the number of collaborating agents C on Entropy of TrustMAS, 
Static and Adaptive Attacks, N = 10x103. 
 
As one can expect, the entropy highly depends on the number of colluding agents. 
What is more, we can observe a significant impact of the static observation for the 
anonymity of TrustMAS system. TrustMAS entropy is significantly lower for static 
attacks than for adaptive scenarios.  
Next we will analyze how exactly pf configuration impacts the entropy of Trust-
MAS system for both attack scenarios. Figures 3 and 4 show entropy of TrustMAS in 
the full spectrum of available pf configuration.  
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 Fig. 3. Entropy of TrustMAS, Static and Adaptive Attacks, N=10. 
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Fig. 4. Entropy of TrustMAS, Static and Adaptive Attacks, N = 10x103. 
 
In the adaptive scenario, a low entropy (close to zero) is obtained for low pf values 
and a high (close to the maximum) entropy is achieved for large pf. In the static scena-
rio, the dependency is quite different and the best results are achieved for the lowest pf 
values. As pf grows, the entropy grows slower logarithmically. This decrease (the 
static attack) of entropy is slightly faster in the small network, contrary to the adaptive 
scenario, where, in the small network, the decrease of entropy is slower than for large 
agent platform. Longer cascades can impose not only larger traffic overheads but can 
also make it easier for the adversary to become a member of this set and effectively 
compromise the security of particular systems, especially when we consider small 
networks. In a small network, agents from the forwarding path constitute a significant 
part of all network nodes. 
The results show that pf configuration of TrustMAS should be in the range of  
[0.66 .. 0.8]. Values lower than 0.66 expose the originator against the adaptive adver-
sary and values higher than 0.8 compromise him by the static attacker. Mean random-
walk path length is  
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then we can stress that acceptable TrustMAS mean path lengths are: 
• minimum: PminTM = 4 for  pf = 0.66, 
• maximum: PmaxTM = 6 for  pf = 0.8. 
 
Forwarding paths shorter than PminTM cannot provide sufficient “crowd” of agents 
which actively anonymize the initiator. If the adversary is yet among this set of agents 
there should be additional 3 other honest agents. On the other hand, the forwarding 
paths longer than 6 agents (PmaxTM) become too easy to enter as the quantity of 
“crowd” provided by agents that passively anonymize the active set becomes insuffi-
cient.   
5   Traffic Performance  
Based on the results achieved during the security evaluation we have analyzed 
TrustMAS traffic performance. Our goal was to measure convergence efficiency of 
proposed routing protocol and its overheads. We have designed and developed own 
MAS simulation environment (written in C++) that allowed us to evaluate: level of 
known routes among SAs, traffic generated by routing protocol for SAs, usage of 
platform’s capacity, and SAs’ links saturation levels. Presented results have been 
achieved under the following assumptions: 
1. Simulation time T = 30 min. – after this period we have observed the stable 
operation of the system. 
2. Number of agents N ∈ {250, 500, 1000, 5000, 10000} – includes small and 
large sizes of agent community. 
3. StegAgents percentage NSA = 10% – typical for open and distributed network 
environments top limit of agents level controlled by one entity. 
4. Probability pf ∈ {0.66, 0.75, 0.8} – obtained during the security analysis of 
the TrustMAS. 
5. Migration rate M ∈ {0, 120-1, 60-1} [s-1] – during traffic performance analy-
sis we have observed that from M = 60-1 TrustMAS operates unstable.  
6. We selected six generic steganographic methods:  
- Network (Internet), bandwidth: 300000 delay: 0, probability: 0.90 
- Image, bandwidth: 100, delay: 0, probability: 0.10 
- Video, bandwidth: 100, delay: 0, probability: 0.10 
- Audio, bandwidth: 80, delay: 0, probability: 0.10 
- Text, bandwidth: 80, delay: 0, probability: 0.05 
- Network (HICCUPS), bandwidth: 225000, delay: 0, probability: 0.05 
7. Routing timers were chosen based on EIGRP routing protocol defaults. De-
fault values from EIGRP were chosen because it is one of the most efficient 
distance vector routing protocols. 
 
First steganographic group describes all techniques that involves protocol stega-
nography for Internet network. That includes e.g. IP, UDP/TCP, HTTP, ICMP etc. 
steganography. Because of these protocols popularity and the amount of traffic they 
generate, we assumed covert bandwidth’s value for this steganographic group at 300 
kbit/s and probability of occurrence for StegAgents in TrustMAS platform at 0.9. 
Next, there are four steganographic groups that correspond to techniques for data 
hiding in the digital content that may be sent through the network (voice, image, vid-
eo and text respectively). We assumed a covert bandwidth for these steganographic 
methods from 80 to 100 bits/s and probability of occurrence for a StegAgent between 
0.05 and 0.1. The last steganographic group characterizes more rarely used stegano-
graphic methods, e.g. medium-dependant solutions like HICCUPS. As stated earlier, 
the achieved steganographic bandwidth for this method may be, in certain conditions, 
about 225 kbit/s and this value was used during simulations. 
 
 
 
5.1 Convergence Analysis 
We consider the mean convergence level characteristics under dynamically changing 
network traffic conditions. First we analyze system behavior for no-migration scena-
rio and then for scenarios with migration rates M = 120-1 min-1 and M = 60-1 min-1 
respectively. Simulation results show 95% confidence intervals and from 25% to 75% 
quantiles surrounding the mean levels of known routes. 
The full convergence is achieved after about 9 minutes in no-migration scenario, 
under dynamically changing conditions, for M=60-1 the TrustMAS platform is not 
fully converged. 
In the first analyzed scenario the convergence is always achieved – confidence in-
tervals equal the mean value (100% after about 9 minutes). In the second scenario 
100% convergence level is possible, however we have observed that mean value does 
not reach the optimum. In the last scenario the 100% level of convergence is rarely 
observed. 
As one expects, the higher pf values are in favor of increasing the convergence 
time.  However all analyzed configurations provide similar results. 
 
5.2 Traffic Overheads Analysis 
We have observed that traffic overheads imposed by the steg-routing protocol are 
between 10 and 12 kbps. Lower values have been obtained for higher migration rate, 
as when agents leave the platform, the number of exchanged large routing tables di-
minishes. Similarly to the convergence analysis, we have found that pf configuration 
has no significant impact. 
The analysis of the TrustMAS capacity usage shows that the steg-routing protocol 
consumes less than 0.01% of the whole platform bandwidth of steg-links. 
The fraction of saturated steg-links in the observed system configuration is neglig-
ible. Even for pessimistic high migration rate the saturation of the system is close to 
zero. 
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Fig. 5 Convergence Time of TrustMAS 
 
 
5.3 Scalability Analysis 
We have repeated the traffic performance analysis for different sizes of simulated 
platform. We have found that the network size extends time of convergence process 
(Fig. 5).  
Moreover, we have observed that under the stable operation of large networks 
(N ∈ {5000, 10000}), some insignificant number of undiscovered routes remains. 
Table 1 contains a summary of the results obtained throughout the analyzed network 
sizes. There, we can observe how long it takes for TrustMAS to reach a stable opera-
tion and its conditions.  
 
Table 1 Convergence of TrustMAS  
Network size 250 500 1 000 5 000 10 000 
Convergence 
time [min] 8.8 18.8 25.2 36 42 
Undiscovered 
routes [%] 0 0 0 0,52 0,8 
 
When we consider small networks, with 25 StegAgents collaborating among other 
225 agent, less than 10 minutes is required for the proposed StegRouting protocol to 
provide 100% of routes between SAs. Considering very large platforms, when we 
have 1000 StegAgents among other 99000 agents, it would take about 40 minutes for 
TrustMAS to reach the stable operation. However, about 0.8% of routes would remain 
undiscovered.  
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Fig. 6 Capacity Usage of TrustMAS 
 
The impact of the network size on TrustMAS overheads has been shown on Fig. 
6. We have found that dependency between scale and the usage of the network’s 
available bandwidth is linear. In the whole analyzed spectrum of network sizes the 
level of StegRouting protocol is very low, as even in the very large platform 
(N = 10000) routing management communication consumes less than 3 ‰ of all 
available system capacity. 
The traffic performance analysis has also covered observations of the number of 
saturated links. In the analyzed scenario the level of links saturated by TrustMAS 
routing is insignificant. The highest values have been observed for the network size of 
N = 1000 agents (Fig. 7). Further extension of network size is in favor of TrustMAS 
communication.   
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Fig. 7 Mean Level of Saturated Links for TrustMAS 
5 Conclusions 
We have evaluated efficiency of TrustMAS both for its security and routing perfor-
mance. Moreover, we have measured overheads imposed by TrustMAS platform 
required to assure the proper level of agents anonymity and their full connectivity. We 
have found that the protocol is efficient and the impact of its overheads is not signifi-
cant. 
Steganographic agents in the TrustMAS platform can communicate anonymously 
in configuration of random-walk algorithm limited to pf ∈ [0.66 .. 0.8]. This range 
corresponds to a mean length of forwarding paths from P ∈ [4 .. 6]. Then, each  
StegAgent should involve about 3 to 5 other agents into the process of the discovery 
message forwarding to effectively hide an association between its identity and the 
sent content. Basically, at least 3 additional TrustMAS agents should relay discovery 
communication to hide the information that the agent is a StegAgent. On the other 
hand, involving more than 5 agents into the random-walk forwarding process also 
significantly reduces anonymity of TrustMAS. When we consider platform containing 
10-20% colluding agents longer forwarding paths finally facilitate dishonest agents to 
penetrate the platform area where the StegAgent is hidden. 
Using obtained results we have simulated the TrustMAS routing in the configura-
tion of random-walk algorithm with  pf ∈ {0.66, 0.75, 0.8} and the routing timers 
configuration typical for the popular EIGRP routing protocol. We have found that 
proposed steganographic routing is efficient and in less than 10 minutes the platform 
becomes fully converged. Moreover, we have observed that the protocol is robust 
against fast agents migration (M = 120-1 s-1). A borderline case was observed for high 
migration rate M = 60-1 s-1 where agents lose all discovered routing information at the 
average rate of one per minute. 
To evaluate practical usefulness of TrustMAS we have measured the traffic over-
heads imposed by the proposed routing protocol. We have found that it requires about 
11 kbps per link which corresponds to less than 0.01% of the system capacity. The 
fraction of saturated links is also negligible.  
The traffic performance analysis confirmed our expectation that the impact of the 
random-walk pf configuration is not significant for platform overheads as the short 
discovery messages generate low traffic. However, higher values of pf are in favor of 
the routing efficiency as including 1 more agent into the discovery forwarding process 
provides the convergence faster by about 1 minute.  
The foregoing results have been obtained for platform of hundreds of agents 
(N = 250). Taking into account a possible global and large scale environment of 
TrustMAS operation we have analyzed behavior of proposed protocol with simulta-
neous N ∈ {500, 1000, 5000, 10000} communicating agents. We have found that the 
large scale of the network does not significantly reduce the system performance. 
However, in very large platforms with N = 5000..10000, some imperfection of the 
proposed routing protocol has been exposed. We should bear in mind that in such a 
scale the proposed distance vector protocol will discover about 99.5..99.2% of all the 
available routes. Still, the proposed solution scales well and can operate vastly in 
large scale networks. 
We have proven that the proposed system is secure, fast-convergent and scalable. 
It can efficiently hide collaboration of designated agents (i.e. StegAgents) in various 
scale networks (up to ten of thousands agents). Moreover, we have proven that 
TrustMAS quickly enables connectivity among SAs. The convergence for small and 
medium size networks is fully achieved and for very large scale networks the pro-
posed distance vector routing protocol does not discover insignificant number of 
routes. The  overheads imposed by routing protocol are negligible.  
Future work will include routing protocol improvements to support large plat-
forms (more than 5000 agents) to eliminate negative routing effects (e.g. routing 
loops) and to gain faster convergence time than currently achieved. Moreover, differ-
ent analyses of various scenarios for other steganographic profiles may be performed 
and a concept of TrustMAS may be adopted to the other environments than MAS. 
Additionally, a prototype of the proposed system for proof-of-concept purposes will 
be created and analyzed. 
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